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THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION IN BOTSWANA: A CREATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS

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ABSTRACT

This article analyses the development of a political system in Botswana with a focus on the constitutional talks leading to the country's independence. It examines the the constitutional negotiations and argues that the manner in which they were conducted, and the setting in which there was no nationalist movement, political party or civil society representation gave birth to a political system of exclusion where political power and access to it are limited to a few people. The article argues that the relations between the executive and parliament, questions of accountability, elections and voting, and the relations between the government and the civil society have also been shaped or predetermined by the undemocratic circumstances under which the Botswana constitution was formed. In post-independence Botswana, as much as there are consultations with the people on a number of issues of national concern, such consultations are a mere formality as they fail to reflect and represent the voices of some key sections of the society (like minorities, civil society, youth, women, labour movement, corporate sector and the media) as should be the case in a democracy.

KEYWORDS : Botswana, democracy, constitutional talks, politics of exclusion,

INTRODUCTION

This article argues that forms of political exclusion in Botswana's political system were unintentionally created by the constitutional negotiations in the preindependence era. This gave birth to a system in which it seems normal to exclude some members of the society from political processes and decisions that affect them. Gamson (1995) defines the politics of exclusion as the kind of politics in which there is active political exclusion and indirect exclusion from political participation. He argues that in active exclusion "...the targeted groups are not simply excluded from life integrity rights, but offenses against them are explicitly encouraged, rewarded and sanctioned by the regime" (p.4). In his view, politics of exclusion can be in the form of indirect exclusion where there is 'social invisibility' in which "...the exclusion is implicit in cultural and institutional practices and is often unintentional" (ibid.). Other writers, amongst them Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2009), and Essed (1991) suggest that the politics of exclusion may be linked to power, where "...marginalised groups tend to be discriminated against, [and] discriminatory acts may be intended or unintended, legally legitimized, may be structural,... [or] occur in passing" (Essed 1992:vii).

In this article, we argue that while in Botswana exclusion is not active, as described by Gamson (1995), indirect forms of political exclusion are evident in the country's political system and institutional practices. We start by outlining the setting of constitutional talks and suggest that such a setting created political exclusion evidenced by; (1) lack of minority representation (2), executive-dominated political system, (3) hierarchical-unitary state, (4) poor women and youth representation and (5) a culture of exclusion in the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) politics.

Scholarly sources on Botswana politics have not directly linked the exclusive nature of Botswana politics to the development of the country's constitution. While factors such as culture have been cited as having contributed to the elite- adult -male-dominated political system in Botswana, the establishment of such a system has been heavily influenced by factors surrounding the Constitutional Review in the pre-independence period. There is a lot of literature on the history and transition of Botswana to an independent state (Tlou and Campbell 1997; Proctor 1966), the development of the Constitution and laws of Botswana (Fawcus and Tilbury 2000; Picard 1985; Cohen and Parson 1976; Stevens 1967; Sanders 1992), the economy, the society and the politics of Botswana (Spence 1964; Holm 1971, Stedman 1993; Wilmsen 1989; Edge and Lekorwe 1998; Maundeni 2005). It is the links between the politics of exclusion and the Constitution of Botswana that this article seeks to establish. To do

this, we rely on secondary sources of information and conduct a critical assessment of these.

Constitutional talks and the development of Botswana's constitution

Our argument is that Botswana's democracy has its roots in the nature of the preindependence constitutional talks, and in the way hereditary chiefs were made part of the independent state. Unlike other countries in Africa where decolonisation was meant to respond to pressures of nationalist movements (Fanon 1963; Tordoff 2002; Galbraith 1972), the Constitutional Review of 1959 in Botswana was different, and seemed to be a strategic way to get rid of the costly and poor colony that Botswana was. The haste to decolonize Botswana coincided with world decolonization (Birmingham 1995; Gordon 1996; Rothermund 2006). The absence of nationalist political movements in the colony constrained the contribution of the common people towards the drafting of the Constitution. Realising the difficulty to reach ordinary people in various autonomous districts and/or tribal reserves in the then Bechuanaland Protectorate, the Constitutional Review Committee relied on the chiefs and *kgotla* (tribal court) meetings to talk to the people (Stevens 1967; Parson 1976). The arrangement of using the *kgotla* for public consultation meetings gave the chiefs a lot of influence on the constitutional talks and on the political system. This resulted in some chiefs such as Seretse Khama, Bathoen II and Linchwe II joining and even leading political parties and actively participating in the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Botswana National Front (BNF) and Botswana Peoples Party (BPP), respectively. Besides Seretse Khama, the other chiefs were interested because they stood for an independent state made of federations of chieftaincies (Proctor, 1966; Maundeni 2005). They opposed the existence of political parties, the formation of a republic and ethnic equality with marginalised groups as evidenced by some sections of the Constitution of Botswana like Sections 77, 78 and 79. Although federations of any kind have democratic potential because they limit the centralization of power and encourage diversity between the federated states or provinces, the chiefs were the only ones demanding a federal state where they would have legislative powers (Proctor 1966).

At the time of the first Constitutional Review in 1959, the hereditary chiefs faced no opposition from any ethnic group. This state of affairs led to the undemocratically constituted review committee whose initial participants were primarily officials of the colonial government and the chiefs who had little commitment to democracy. The birth of the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) and of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in the early 1960s, with distinct ideologies and programmes, and their subsequent participation in the 1963

Constitutional Review meeting at Lobatse (Sillery 1974; Stevens 1967; Proctor 1966) was a very significant and welcome move to democratize the composition of the review committee. Unlike in the 1959 talks, more institutions were involved for the first time, and the two (2) political parties (although they had chiefs amongst their leadership ranks), represented the interests of the people as opposed to those of hereditary chiefs. The chiefs were represented and contributed to the design of the independence constitution, giving it Sections 77, 78 and 79 that recognised certain tribes or ethnic groups as the main tribes and others as marginal (Constitution of Botswana, Sect. 77, 78 and 79). Elsewhere in the continent of Africa, the situation was different in that at independence, constitutional talks included the active participation of political parties and armed nationalist movements (Crowder 1978; Rothermund 2006) and not traditional institutions like the chieftaincy.

The 1963 constitutional talks involved more participants, but not enough to generate an inclusive political system in Botswana. They were also undemocratic in a number of other ways. First, there was no democratic movement to back up the constitutional talks, and to express any dissatisfaction. The few demonstrations that the BPP was able to organize were easily suppressed by the Legislative Council (Stevens 1967). Second, the chiefs controlled the *kgotla*, which was the main avenue for transmitting political information to the people. Political parties were denied access to the *kgotla*. In contrast, in most Colonial African countries, traditional structures (similar to the *kgotla*) were not the only means to reach the people; open spaces and stadia were available and were used to hold political rallies to disseminate information (Rothermund 2006; Gailey 1989), lobby for support and consult people on key issues that concerned them. The arrangement of using only the *kgotla* in the case of Botswana made it hard to mobilise the bulk of the population who were under the control of the chiefs to express their collective will. Third, the constitutional talks were also undemocratic because the BPP was consumed by an internal split with one faction led by Phillip Matante, known as BPP-Matante and another led by Kgalemang Motsete, referred to as BPP-Motsete (Stevens 1967). As the two factions attempted to exclude one another from the talks, the split prevented the BPP from participating fully in the constitutional talks. This situation left the BDP with the support of the protectorate government more influential on the final outcome of the constitution of Botswana. The hereditary chiefs sitting in the Constitutional Review Committee were thus inclined towards protecting their interests and to marginalise other ethnic groups (Proctor 1966).

This is the context in which the constitution of Botswana was negotiated and approved. Despite the shortcomings under which the independence constitution was constructed, it is credited for allowing the existence and equality of multiple political parties, and is contrasted with the undemocratic practices of other African countries like Zambia and Malawi at the time (Macpherson 1974; Mulford 1967; Hall 1969; William 1978; Rotberg 1965; Meredith 2005; Mwakikagile 2006).

Lack of minority representation

The independence constitution of Botswana and the context in which it was negotiated created a skewed development of the country's democratic political system. According to former president, Festus Mogae (2005), the 1965 parliamentary elections were not the birth of democracy in Botswana, but its modernization and maturation. He further argued that Tswana chiefs had developed a political culture of regular consultation with the public in *kgotla* meetings, and receptiveness to public opinion, friendliness to the Europeans who possessed capital and skills to be exploited for the development of the country. The modernization of Tswana democracy meant the embedding of liberal democratic institutions into Tswana values and practices that had failed to promote equality among the different

ethnic groups. It should be noted however, that chieftainship was a hereditary and not an elective institution and, therefore, could not be regarded as democratic. The involvement of chiefs in the constitutional talks also left their lasting mark in the political and legal systems, such as Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the constitution which are undemocratic and exclusionary. This was a result of the fact that only 'major tribes' were consulted, while the 'minority tribes' remained largely unrepresented and their voices ignored.

Executive-dominated political system

The involvement of colonial officials in the constitutional review talks imparted some liberal values on the independence constitution.

This constitution created a system in which the executive is strongly embedded in Parliament and leads from within it. That is, most of the country's legislation is initiated and driven by the executive, and is passed through Parliament. Carrying a parliamentary majority is crucial in the Botswana political system and therefore, the country has a strong constitutional executive that leads Parliament from within.

'The extent of executive influence over the legislative branch is particularly evident in the lawmaking process. Although the Parliament's principal function is to make laws, as in all parliamentary democracies, the whole of this process – especially the most decisive prelegislative stages – is controlled and driven completely by the executive [...] Almost all bills are discussed in cabinet meetings chaired by the president, and are presented in Parliament by a cabinet member who, along with the whips, ensures the bill goes through without significant modifications. Because of the executive's ability to ensure that desired legislation is passed, it is fair to conclude that, to all intents and purposes, the executive controls Parliament' (Fombad, 2005: 322).

According to Maundeni, (2005), the president can only make major reforms (political and legal) by consulting either the public or Parliament. However, the parliamentary powers were reduced when President Seretse Khama ceased to have an elected constituency in 1972 and ceased standing for parliamentary elections (and there were no presidential elections either). Seretse also stopped participating actively in Parliament discussions and appointed his Minister of Finance and Development Planning, who was also the Vice President, to be the Leader of the House of Parliament (Maundeni 2000). These reforms, on the one hand, reduced the active participation of the president in Parliament, freeing him from day-to-day debates and from the Parliamentary business. On the other hand, they freed Parliament from presidential control and, in theory at least, enhanced democratization. However, more worrying about these reforms was that the Vice President, Ketumile Masire, had lost his parliamentary constituency elections twice against the Bangwaketse hereditary chief Bathoen II in 1969 and 1974 elections, but was reinstated in all the positions he had previously occupied without Parliament's approval.

Ironically, Masire lost even when elections were run from the Office of the President, an indication that there was no rigging of elections. The electorally defeated and specially elected Masire became not only the Leader of the House from 1972 onwards, but also the Vice President of the republic and Minister of Finance and Development Planning. While Masire's appointment was developmentally positive as shown by the country's economic performance during his vice presidency (Leith 2000; Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; Taylor 2003), it was democratically negative in the sense that it was not tied to winning constituency elections (Maundeni, 2004).

Although the independence constitution gave excessive powers to the state president, some sections of it conferred some power on the Parliament. One of these is the rule that only parliamentarians are

eligible for appointment to the positions of cabinet minister or vice-president (Constitution of Botswana, Sect. 39(1)). This was a constitutional reform introduced in 1997 when President Masire was stepping down. Masire won a constituency only in 1979 and retained all his other portfolios. When President Seretse Khama died in 1980, the BDP parliamentary caucus chose Masire to succeed him as president (Hackland, 1988:147-148), thus the parliamentary caucus and Parliament chose the next president, indicating the vibrancy of the parliamentary system in the country at the time. However, Masire's vice president, Peter Mmusi, also lost a bye-election for Gaborone South to Dr Kenneth Koma in 1985 at a time when all specially elected positions had been filled, and before the above constitutional reform. A specially elected Member of Parliament, Gaotlaetse U.S. Matlhabaphiri, stepped down and was given the post of High Commissioner, thus creating a parliamentary seat for Mmusi whom the president intended to appoint as Vice President and Minister of Finance.

Despite his enormous powers, the president is constitutionally accountable to the Parliament, and this was another input from colonial officials participating in the constitutional review talks. The Constitution of Botswana (Sect. 50(1)) states that, the Cabinet shall "...be responsible to the National Assembly for all things done by or under the authority of the President, Vice President or any minister in the execution of his power". The principle of accountability obliges the president to deliver a state of the nation address to Parliament every year, subjecting him to peer-review. For 15 days, Parliament allows the back-bench, ministers, the opposition bench and its leader to freely react to the speech. During that time, the public and private newspapers and radio stations, and Botswana Television publish different reactions from academics, church organizations, labour unions and cultural groups (Maundeni, et al 2007:13). This kind of public scrutiny and cordial exchange, to some extent, promotes accountability and democracy in Botswana. For instance, in the process of debating the state of the nation address in 2005, Parliament passed a motion, sponsored by an opposition MP, requiring the government to review the Value-Added Tax (VAT). These rare occurrences of passing binding motions asking for the review of certain government policies in a way, enables Parliament to hold the executive to account.

Parliament, a creation of the independence constitution, has also moved to assert itself in relation to the executive in recent years, but has also taken important steps to make itself accountable to the society. It has put in place measures to ensure that the public has a clear view of what Parliament does; that representatives make reasonable visits and consultation with the constituencies; that representatives listen to and speak on behalf of, their constituencies; and that representatives get funding for constituency-based projects. Therefore, Parliament has taken serious steps of taking itself to the people. According to the Speaker of the National Assembly (2005),

'It amended the Standing Orders to allow Members to debate in both English and the vernacular which has attracted more people to the parliamentary debates. In 2003 and 2004, the Speaker and his deputy (unfortunately, both males then) held 173 kgotla meetings in different parts of the country, informing people about the role of Parliament and sparking debates nationally. In addition, Parliament has also made itself accessible to school visits. Furthermore, Parliament temporarily hosted the Youth Parliament in 2004 and invited young people from different parts of the country to converge in the Chamber and debate issues'.

Unfortunately, each Speaker of Parliament emphasises different things, sometimes resulting in discontinuities of practices.

Hierarchical-unitary state

Botswana's exclusionary politics is also characterised by a hierarchical-unitary state in which Parliament regards local authorities as its own creation rather than as equals and competitors. 'All local authorities in Botswana exist by virtue of ordinary Acts of Parliament and, at least in theory, any of them could be abolished at any time by Parliament. Local authorities are not included in the Constitution, and consequently, do not have the inherent competence derived from it' (Lekorwe, 1998: 74). Thus, local democracy enjoys no independent existence as it derives its standing from another political institution, namely the Parliament. But to have transferred state power from the chiefs to a democratically elected central government was an enormous achievement. However, having local authorities whose existence is not entrenched in the Constitution weakens local democracy. This arrangement also affects service delivery due to the bureaucratic requirements that have to be satisfied.

Botswana's politics of indirect exclusion is characterised by an unequal relationship between political institutions and civil society. In most sectors, policy-coordinating councils have been established in which the government and NGOs work together. For instance, according to Maundeni (2004), the Council for Women in Development was launched in 1999. In it, women NGOs and the Department of Women Affairs (now the Department of Gender Affairs) sit together to review and design policies. According to Maundeni (2004), the establishment of such policy-coordinating councils, which are meant to complement public bureaucracies, was a significant democratisation step. He also notes that, unfortunately, the secretariats of such policy-coordinating councils are under the control of the line ministry and not the council. Such centralised collaboration, in which the policy-coordinating council does not control the secretariat, is being challenged by the NGOs, who prefer to have controlling powers on the policy implementing secretariats.

The Government's resistance to the idea of subjecting 'secretariats' to the control of policy-coordinating councils has led to new twists in the democratization debate. As a result 'good' policies are not adequately implemented or are not implemented at all. Such negative charges largely come from the private sector that is pressing for either more privatization or for more tripartite task forces, and from the NGOs who want to gain implementing powers and control over the secretariats. For instance, a National Business Conference that was held in the City of Francistown in August 2002 recommended that "a tripartite task force, involving the government, the private sector and the labour movement under the auspices of the High Level Consultative Council should be formed to identify missing elements in the diversification strategies with a timetable and measurable targets for its realization" (Mmegi Business Week, 16-22 August, 2002: B1). Although it is not enough, Parliament invites the business community to attend the reading of the budget speech and to sit in during the budget debates. Such invitations help to make Parliament more accountable to the business community.

However, workers have expressed concern over their poor representation in the drawing of the budget and on major government decisions that affect them. Part of this poor representation of the workers' interests can be blamed on the constitutional talks, which took place at a time when labour unions were just emerging, and as such were largely ignored. The formation of the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) promised to offer the labour sector a significant representation, but that has been since defeated by 2 factors: first, divisions within labour movement because labour unions and associations were unhappy with their representation through BFTU, leading to the formation of another labour federation in 2009. Second, the government's determination to cripple and control labour unions has asserted the hierarchical-unitary state of Botswana. This is evidenced by the recent developments following

the 2011 public sector strike in which the government banned labour activists employed by the government from making political statements, despite the fact that issues of labour are inherently political.

The President of Botswana, due to his constitutional powers, has also sought to exclude or 'destroy' political opposition parties. At some stage he was quoted as saying he wanted to weaken them. He has also not taken political opposition parties seriously by not engaging them in any of his key political decisions, such as the appointment of heads of public institutions like the Ombudsman, and the funding of political parties. One major decision that the executive made which was democratically regressive was the sweeping reforms aimed at aiding the president to hold on to power and control the Office of the Leader of Opposition in Parliament, by micro-managing or regulating his public meetings. Worse still, the rivalry between the opposition parties in Parliament prevented them from electing a leader of the opposition until a by-election gave it to the BCP in January 2014.

The poor representation of women and the youth

The poor representation of some population groups during the constitutional talks and the failure to rectify that in the early years of independence left women and the youth politically marginalised and disadvantaged. The Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture was established in recent years, and it focuses mainly on funding sports activities and youth economic projects with no programme to educate the youth on matters of politics or, at least, infusing politics as a subject in the school curriculum to give children an appreciation of and orientation to politics at a young age. By creating the Youth Parliament, Mogae's administration offered some hope for the youth. Although the initiative was received with mixed reactions, it was a positive development which promised to engage the youth and create political awareness amongst them. Unfortunately, the Youth Parliament was discontinued, and Ian Khama's regime has never tried to revive it.

Women's representation has not been a priority in Botswana's political system. Since the Department of Women's Affairs (now the Department of Gender Affairs) was established, it has not received much attention from the government until 40 years after independence. There is no percentage of parliamentary and/or council seats reserved for women, even though Botswana's democracy is heavily reliant on women voters (Maundeni, 2005). For instance, more women than men registered to vote in 1999, 2004 and 2009 (IEC, 2002; 2004, 2009). In the 1999 election, there were 266,449 registered women voters compared to only 214,522 registered male voters (IEC, 2002:51). In addition 311,265 females registered for the 2004 election, compared to only 239,148 males (IEC, 2004: 89). Thus, the data from the 1999 and 2004 Botswana elections show that more women registered for the elections than their male counterparts. The 2009 elections also show a similar trend where, of the 723 617 people registered to vote, more than half of them (404,283) were women (IEC 2009).

Rural districts registered more women than men. For example, in the 1999 election, the North West district registered 24,549 women compared to 19,941 men. In the 2004 election that district registered 28,511 women compared to 22, 865 males. Kgatleng registered 12,808 women compared to 9,609 men in 1999, and 16,069 women compared to 11,995 men in 2004, and 20,933 females compared to 16,564 males in 2009. The Central District registered 80,269 women compared to only 54,286 men in 1999, and 92,543 women compared to 61,201 men in 2004 (IEC, 2004), and 122,778 women compared to 87,104 men in 2009 (IEC, 2009: 73). The challenge facing Botswana is to sustain the high registration levels of women and to improve that of men. Strategies will have to be worked out to make this a possibility.

Table 1: Women's popular vote during national elections

	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009
BDP	68	65	54	54	51	53
BNF	20	27	37	25	26	22
BIP/IFP	3	2	-	-	-	-
BPP	7	4	4	-	-	1

BPU	-	1	1	-	-	-
BCP	-	-	-	11	16	19
BAM	-	-	-	5	3	2
NDF	-	-	-	-	0.8	-
MELS	-	-	-	-	0	0

Interestingly, more women voted for the Botswana Democratic Party than any other party. Moreover, the BDP won in most of the rural constituencies. In contrast, urban centres registered more men than women. For instance, Francistown registered 11,685 men compared to 11,017 women in 1999 although in 2004 this changed to 12,510 men compared to 13,662 women), and in 2009 more women than men registered, with 17,094 women and 15,819 men registered respectively. Gaborone registered 21,643 men compared to 16,917 women in 1999. The gender imbalance did not shift much in 2004 as it remained at 24,029 men to 22,217 women, and 31,813 women to 31,387 men in 2009. Lobatse registered 5,006 men compared to 4,864 women in 1999 and the gender balance shifted slightly to 5,216 men and 5,737 women registered in 2004, and to 6,950 women and 6,452 men in Lobatse. Gantsi registered 5,252 men to 5,224 women and the gender pattern did not change in the 2004 and 2009 National Elections as it remained at 7,165 men compared to 7,129 women (2004), and 8,675 men and 8,613 women (2009) in the same constituency. The challenge facing Botswana is to keep the numbers of registered men high, but to attract more urban women to register. In urban centres, more men than women register and more men vote for the opposition than for the ruling party. In fact, the opposition wins in most urban constituencies. In addition, the main opposition party, the BNF has experienced more splits than any other party and, as a result its popular vote has tended to fluctuate.

According to the voter apathy study conducted by the Democracy Project (2002), the majority (74.1%) of eligible young people did not register for the 1999 general election and this posed a challenge to youth organisations, to the Independent Electoral Commission and to the nation. An analysis of how age and gender were likely to influence one's willingness to vote was done by the Democracy Research Project (DRP) after the March 2004 Opinion Poll, and it was found that there willingness to vote, with older respondents more likely to vote than the youth aged 18 to 27 years. Furthermore, more than 80% of respondents whose age was 38 years or older had indicated that they were ready to vote. Among the youth, only 69% were ready to vote. The challenge facing Botswana and youth organisations is how to generate accurate registration that specifies age and how to encourage more young people to participate in the electoral process. The figure cited above show that generally women register to vote, yet their voice is not represented in the political system.

The culture of exclusion in BDP politics

The politics of exclusion created by the independence constitution has not only affected the political system of Botswana, but it has also engraved a culture of exclusion in the politics of the ruling BDP. The ruling party has struggled with factionalism over the past 20 years, with one faction seeking to exclude the other from political power. First it was the Kedikilwe-Kwelagobe faction known as Barata-phathi and the Merafhe-Nkate faction known as the A-Team. The factions

have developed over the years with new factional leaders coming in and loyalties switching between the groups (see also Lotshwao and Suping, this volume). When factions geared themselves towards excluding each other from political power, and internal talks proved difficult to close the rift, ad-hoc measures were employed to address the situation. Such measures included an appeal to the founding president, Sir Seretse Khama's magic, by bringing his son, Ian Khama, the then commander of BDF and now president, into the rank and file of the BDP to smother the fire of factionalism. Before him, compromise lists (that means lists agreed on by the rival factions) had been put in place, but factions proved to be resilient, with some democrats joining opposition political parties, some becoming independents and others forming, in 2010, the first ever serious break-away political party in the history of BDP, namely the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD), (a full account of this split is given by Lotshwao and Suping, this volume). The culture of exclusion has continued to haunt the ruling party to date and undermines inner party democracy. The 2013 electoral defeat of the Barata-Phati faction and its subsequent removal from the BDP central committee at the Maun BDP congress and its replacement by a new crop of mostly younger people with entrepreneurial goals marked an entrenchment of factional rivalry within the BDP. Such defeat of a whole faction amounts to exclusionary internal politics and has a tendency to prompt the defeated faction to regroup and to stage a comeback.

CONCLUSION

Limited constitutional participation characterised by the absence of social movements, the presence of a strong chieftainship that ruled over dozens of minority ethnic groups, and the involvement of colonial officials paved way for a political system that combines a strong parliamentary emphasis, a strong executive embedded in the Parliament, and a constitution that marginalises minority groups. This set-up is clothed with liberal politics in which there is a general agreement among opinion leaders that the culture of competitive democracy in Botswana has been established (Mogae, 2005; Molutsi, 2005; Maundeni, 2005). The President delivers his state of the nation address in Parliament, subjecting himself to peer-review and to parliamentary sanction and approval. The budget speech and the national development plans are also delivered in and approved by Parliament. In addition, Parliament has created a less autonomous local government structure that is subordinate to it through the Ministry of Local Government. Thus, Botswana is a stable and mature liberal democracy that embeds a political culture of marginalising minorities, even though the strength of its maturity is yet to be tested through a change of government. Moreover, factional rivalry within the ruling party has added a new dimension to exclusionary politics.

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